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Daniel F. Potter* Compensation on
Expropriation: The Effect of
Zoning and Other Land Use
Restrictions on the Award
I. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to ascertain the extent to which the
existence of publicly-imposed land use restrictions affects the
quantum of compensation payable on expropriation. As yet, this
matter has not arisen in the case law of Nova Scotia. However, if
the events which surrounded the plans for the now abandoned
Sackville landfill site project, discussed below, are any precursor
of things to come, the effect of use restrictions on compensation
awards will not much longer be a moot issue.
The problem has, of course, come before the courts and
compensation tribunals in other Canadian jurisdictions where the
pressures of urban growth have for some time been forcing the
various levels of government to regulate the use of property and to
plan for and to acquire lands in aid of the provision of such services
as highways, parks, schools, water supply, sewage disposal, and so
on. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the proposed Sackville
sanitary land-fill site just mentioned was a response to the demands
of urban growth in the Halifax-Dartmouth area. It is trite to point
out, therefore, that as the demand on government to supply services
and to take an active part in assembling land for public housing and
other such projects increases, every facet of expropriation law, and
especially the more undeveloped aspects such as those to be dealt
with in this article, will come into focus more sharply in Nova
Scotia.
Obviously, the legal backdrop against which the present subject
falls to be considered is the land-use planning regime. Indeed, the
whole subject of compensation on expropriation is but a part of the
larger, current debate concerning the public interest and private
rights as reflected in the planning process. Referring to some of the
*Daniel F. Potter, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1976; Associate, Burchell, Jost, MacAdam
and Hayman, Halifax
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problems under the Nova Scotia Planning Act,' the recent Royal
Commission on Education, Public Services and Provincial-
Municipal Relations pointed out that:
The most contentious matters arise because of attitudes to land
ownership and because of differing views of private rights and
the public interest. The issues encompass land acquisition and
ownership, access, control, taxation, use, and planning. 
2
In a more blunt manner, another writer, in an article entitled
"Expropriation without Compensation" (a now well-worn phrase),
warned readers of The Business Quarterly Review:
There is one cloud on the horizon, however, and that relates to
Land Use Control. The increased concern for the ecology will
quite properly bring more and more land under greater
governmental control and in the process people are going to be
told what they can do - and what is more important, what they
cannot do. 3
Implicit in these two excerpts is the basic philosophical question
of policy as to who should bear the costs of a publicly-controlled
approach to land use. But, notwithstanding that the question may be
a basic one and that the debate still rages, the classic answer at this
time in virtually every Canadian jurisdiction, and certainly in Nova
Scotia, has been the private land owner must bear the costs, at least
as far as any diminution in the value of private property resulting
from use restrictions is concerned. 4 If any authority be required for
this proposition, reference can be made to Canadian Petrofina Ltd.
v. Martin and St. Lambert, where it was stated by Fauteux J.:
The whole object and purpose of a zoning statutory power is to
empower the municipal authority to put restrictions, in the
general public interest, upon the right which a land owner, unless
and until the power is implemented, would otherwise have to
erect upon his land such buildings as he thinks proper. Hence the
1. S.N.S. 1969, c. 16, as am. by S.N.S. 1970, c. 87; 1970-71, c. 71
2. N.S. 2 Royal Commission on Education, Public Services and Provincial-
Municipal RELATIONS (Halifax: Queen's Printer, 1974) (commonly known as the
"Graham Report") c. 18 ("Planning") at 88
3. P. V. Betts, Expropriation Without Compensation (1973), 38 Bus. Q. Rev. 5
at 5
4. While this article is restricted to a consideration of cases where the value of
property owners' lands is decreased as a result of use restrictions, it is obvious that
not all property values will be affected adversely by use designations - indeed
they will often be enhanced (betterment). For a good discussion of the interaction
between planning and land values and the English approach in dealing with this
phenomenon, see generally, N. Lichfield, Economics of Planned Development
(London: Estates Gazette Ltd., 1956) and especially Part VI thereof.
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status of land owner cannotper se affect the operation of a by-law
implementing the statutory power without defeating the statutory
power itself. Prior to the passing of such a by-law the proprietary
rights of a land owner are then insecure in the sense that they are
exposed to any restrictions which the city, acting within its
statutory power, may impose. 5
The effect of the authorities 6 would appear to be generally that in
order to be relieved from the use restrictions imposed by a zoning
by-law by having it declared ultra vires, the land owner must prove
to the court that not only was its enactment discriminatory in fact or
that it amounted to a total prohibition on use, but also that it either
constituted an unreasonable use of power (in the sense of being
oppressive or palpably absurd) or that it was passed in bad faith.
In addition to the case authority, the Planning Act 7 makes it quite
clear that, in adopting a Municipal Development Plan, a council
may provide for such things as the use of lands in the municipality 8
and, more importantly in the present context, the reservation of land
for public purposes. 9 The Act contemplates that these and other
policy statements contained in a Municipal Development Plan will
be given legal effect by the adoption of zoning by-laws10 and that
property owners will not be entitled to compensation for any
diminution in value of lands which may be caused as a result.'1
Upon expropriation, then, the question becomes one of to what
extent, if any, is the owner entitled to base his claim for
compensation on a higher (more valuable) use than that permitted
by the existing zoning or other use designation governing the
5. [1959] S.C.R. 453 at458-59; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 761 at 765
6. See City of Toronto v. Board of Trustees of R.C. Separate Schools for Toronto,
[1926] A.C. 81; [1925] 3 D.L.R. 880 (P.C.) (Can.); Township of Scarborough v.
Bondi, [1959] S.C.R. 444; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 161; Soo Mill and Lumber Co. v. City
of Sault Ste. Marie, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 78; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 2 N.R. 428; Lacewood
Development Co. v. City of Halifax (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 692; 58 D.L.R. (3d)
383 (sub nom. Re Laceivood Development Co. and City of Halifax); Barrett
Lumber Co. v. Municipality of County of Halifax, S.H. 05946, judgment delivered:
February 21, 1975, as yet unreported (N.S.S.C., T.D.)
7. S.N.S. 1969, c. 16
8. Section 13 (3) (b)
9. Section 13 (3) (c)
10. Section33 (1)
11. Section 42 (1). While there is some doubt whether the term "injurious
affection" has been properly used in this context inasmuch as it is generally
restricted to situations where value is diminished by some development on a
neighbouring property, the intent of the section is clearly that the public interest
should prevail over any private rights affected. See E. C. Todd, The Mystique of
Injurious Affection in the Laiv of Expropriation (1967), 3 U.B.C. L. Rev. 127
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property. In other words, are there any circumstances under which a
dispossessed owner is entitled to claim compensation on the basis of
a "paper use" of the property which he would not have been legally
entitled to implement or realize had his property not been
expropriated?
This article will be devoted to the task of determining how this
question has been dealt with in those Canadian jurisdictions where it
has arisen with a view to projecting what might be the outcome
when it comes to be dealt with in Nova Scotia. To this end, I will
first give a brief outline of the general basis of compensation under
the current expropriation statutes and then move on to a
consideration of the decided cases and the factors which they
disclose as being relevant to the issue. Next, brief consideration will
be given to the attempts of some jurisdictions to deal with the
question directly through legislation. Finally, I will assess whether
the state of the law is satisfactory in those jurisdictions with similar
legislation to that of Nova Scotia, or whether the legislative
solutions of other jurisdictions are desirable.
II. Basis of Compensation - Generally
A complete discussion of the principles of compensation under
Canadian expropriation law would be beyond the scope of this
paper. 12 For present purposes, it is sufficient to describe briefly the
reforms which have occurred in this area in most Canadian
jurisdictions over the past ten years or so.
In order to understand why reform of the basis of compensation
was necessary it should be noted that expropriation statutes
traditionally provided only that "due compensation" should be paid
to an expropriated party. 13 This left the task of determining the basis
of compensation to the courts which, after a long series of
12. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject see: 16 Ont. Law Reform
Commission: Report on the Basis for Compensation on Expropriation (Toronto:
Dept. of Attorney-General, 1967) at 12; R. D. Yachetti, The New Approach to
Compensation, [1970] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 301 (Recent Developments in
Real Estate Law); Institute of Law Research and Reform, Working Paper:
Expropriation - Principles of Compensation (Edmonton: U. of Alta., 1971); 12
Institute of Law Research and Reform, Expropriation (Edmonton: U. of Alta.,
1972) at 69-122; E. C. Todd, Winds of Change and the Law of Expropriation
(1961), 39 Can. B. Rev. 542 at 544-61; J. W. Morden, An Introduction to the
Expropriations Act, 1968-69, (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1969); R. Gosse,
Expropriation: The Law Reform Commission's Working Paper (1971), 29
Advocate 302
13. It should be noted that in Canada no compensation is ever payable in respect of
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conflicting cases, adopted what is known as the "value to the
owner" approach. This test was set out explicitly by Rand J. in
Diggon-Hibben Ltd. v. The King as follows:
[T]ie owner at the moment of expropriation is deemed as without
title, but all else remaining the same, and the question is what
would he as a prudent man, at that moment, pay for the property
rather than be ejected from it. 14
The elements of this test were said to consist of market value,
damages for disturbance, plus any special value, arrived at in a
lump sum, without necessarily attributing specific figures to each
item of loss. 15 Being subjective and uncertain, the "value to the
owner" test made it difficult to negotiate settlements and, even
where it was applied by arbitrators and courts, it led to gross
overcompensation in some cases 16 and undercompensation in
others, especially in blighted areas. 17
It has been as a result of these inequities and uncertainties
inherent in the "value to the owner" approach that all Canadian
common law jurisdictions, except British Columbia, Saskatchewan,
and Prince Edward Island,18 have adopted what has been described
as a ". . . black letter code of compensation law . . ,".19 The
content of the compensation provisions in all the new Acts is
basically the same in that all require the separate assessment of
specific heads of compensation culminating in a "built-up"
award.
20
property taken except as authorized by statute: Sisters of Charity of Rockingham v.
The King, [1922] 2 A.C. 315 at 322; 67 D.L.R. 209 at 210-11 (P.C.) (Can.),
subject to the well established presumption that it is not intended to take land
without compensation. See G. S. Challies, The Law of Expropriation (2d ed.
Montreal: Wilson and Lafleur, 1963) at 82
14. [1949]S.C.R.712at715; [1949]4D.L.R.785at787
15. Ontario Law Reform Commission Report, supra, note 12 at 15
16. See Todd, supra, note 12 at 546
17. See H. E. Manning, Expropriation of Lands and Imaginary Values (1967), 15
Chitty's L.J. 37 at 38
18. Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1970 (Ist Supp.), c. 16; The Expropriation Act,
S.A. 1974, c. 27; The Expropriation Act, S.M. 1970, c. 78; The Expropriations
Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 154; Expropriation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. E-14;
Expropriation Act, 1973, S.N.S. 1973, c. 7; The Expropriation Act, R.S.N. 1970,
c. 121. The references to the three provinces which have retained the value to the
owner approach are: Land Clauses Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 209; The Expropriation
Procedure Act, 1968, S.S. 1968, c. 21; The Expropriation Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1951,
c. 53.
19. Morden, supra, note 12
20. There are additional provisions in the Alberta and Manitoba Acts which are
germane to the present topic and which are discussed infra.
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The backbone of the modern compensation provisions is the
"market value" approach which is fleshed out with other specific
heads of compensation such as disturbance damages, reinstatement,
"a home for a home" provisions, inter alia, to ensure complete
recovery in diverse situations. The definition of market value in all
of the Acts is similar and is expressed in the Nova Scotia Act as
. . . the amount that would have been paid for the land if, at the
time of its taking, it had been sold in the open market by a willing
seller to a willing buyer. 21
The Ontario Law Reform Commission had recommended that there
be an express reference to the willing buyer in order to ensure that
the "value to the owner" concept would be abandoned. 
2 2
The switch away from the "value to the owner" approach does
not mean, however, that the market value must be based on the
existing use. It had been well established at common law that if the
expropriated party could prove that the land had some special
adaptability or suitability for a potential use which would give it
greater value than the value based on the use to which it was being
put at the time, he was entitled to be compensated on the basis of the
potential use. This fundamental principle has recently been affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen in Right of Nova
Scotia v. POW Investments Ltd.,23 where it was held that where
undeveloped land is expropriated, the present value of its
potentiality for future development is to be taken into account. 2 4 In
order to avoid double recovery in these situations it had also been
established at common law that where the land is valued on the basis
of highest and best use (i.e. potential use), the owner is not entitled
to receive disturbance damage as well.
25
Inasmuch as the scheme of most of the new Acts 26 is to
compensate the owner on the basis of market value or, alternatively,
on the aggregate of the market value based on present use plus
disturbance damage, with the owner to receive the higher of these
two figures, 27 it is clear that the highest and best use principle of
21. Section 27(1)
22. Ontario Law Reform Commission Report, supra, note 12 at 19
23. [1975]2 S.C.R. 86; 45 D.L.R. (3d) 398; 6 L.C.R. 305
24. See also, Brushett Realty Ltd. v. Province of Nova Scotia (1974), 6 N.S.R.
(2d) 462 (S.C., A.D.)
25. Horn v. Sunderland, [1941] 2 K.B. 26; [1941] 1 All E.R. 480 (C.A.)
26. It is noteworthy that only the Newfoundland Act has restricted the basis of
compensation to the existing use value: s. 27(1) (a), with a discretion in the Board
to award additional compensation in certain circumstances: s. 27(2)
27. E.g. section 27(2) (a) or (b)
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ascertaining market value has not been abandoned. 28 It has been
argued, however, that there was an inherent flexibility in the "value
to the owner" concept which enabled arbitrators and the courts to
make exorbitant awards on the basis of the present value of all
foreseeable potential uses, especially where properties subject to
zoning restrictions were concerned. 29 This contention will be
considered in due course; for the present, it is sufficient to reiterate
that there appears to be nothing in the new expropriation Acts per se
(except in Newfoundland 30) to bar a claim based on the present
value of a property for a potential use.
It will no doubt be appreciated that the ability to claim
compensation for the loss of the value of a potential use is a crucial
threshold requirement for anyone basing his claim on a higher use
than that permitted by existing zoning because, by definition (with
the exception of legal non-conforming uses), the present use will
always be one permitted by existing zoning and, conversely, the
potential use will always be one that will not be permitted.
Before turning to the cases, two related aspects of compensation
which caused problems under the old law and which have been dealt
with in the modern statutes should be mentioned. The issue arose in
many cases as to whether in fixing the compensation to be awarded
any regard should be had, first, to the purpose to which the
expropriated land was to be put by the taker and, secondly, to any
increase or decrease in the market value of the property by reason of
any knowledge of the prospect of expropriation. These two issues
are covered in the Nova Scotia Act as follows:
33. In determining the value of land expropriated, no account
shall be taken of
(a) any anticipated or actual use by the expropriating authority of
the land at any time after the depositing of the expropriation
document in the registry of deeds;
(c) any increase or decrease in the value of the land resulting from
the anticipation of expropriation by the expropriating authority or
from any knowledge or expectation, prior to the expropriation of
the purpose for which the land was expropriated.
28. This is obvious from the reports of the Ontario Law Reform Commission,
supra, note 12 at 21-23 and Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform, Report
No. 12,supra, note 12 at73.
29. Manning, supra, note 17 at 38
30. Supra, note 26
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While it may be open to debate whether section 33(a) was
designed to cover all types of uses to which the expropriating
authority might put the land including, for example, the extraction
of gravel, 31 it is at least clear that the intent is to preclude the owner
from receiving an undeserved windfall in cases where the land is to
be used for purposes of a development scheme. 32
Section 33(c) is apparently intended to cover situations where the
open market value of the property fluctuates by reason of public
knowledge of imminent or actual expropriation and the stipulation
that neither an increase nor a decrease should be taken into account
reflects the policy that, at least where land is actually expropriated,
the owner should neither enjoy a benefit nor suffer a detriment by
reason of state participation in the "market". It must be noted,
however, that this provision has not been, nor should it be,
construed as covering directly situations where some governmental
authority has affected the value of property by the imposition of use
restrictions, whether or not such restrictions have been imposed to
accommodate the use for which the property is slated upon
expropriation. Indeed, if this section could be so construed, the
whole question of the effect of use restrictions on compensation
awards would be resolved, and this, as will be seen from the
discussion of the authorities that follow, is far from being the case.
III. The Cases
The first significant Canadian case to deal with the effect of zoning
by-laws on an expropriation compensation award was the decision of
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Gibson and City of Toronto.33 In
that case, the City Council had, on August 18, 1910, adopted a
31. The Ontario Law Reform Commission Report, supra, note 12 at 24, had
recommended that where the land was taken for construction materials, provision
should be made for the compensation to reflect the value of the materials taken.
This recommendation was not accepted by the Ontario Legislature and does not
appear in the Acts of any of the other jurisdictions. In the opinion of at least one
writer, the exclusion of this provision will probably wipe out the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Fraser v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 445; 40 D.L.R.
(2d) 707, in favour of the expropriating authority. In that case, the property had
been expropriated for the purpose of extracting gravel to build the Canso Causeway
and it was held that the owner was entitled to be compensated for the value of the
gravel taken as rock in situ, notwithstanding that it only had this value to the taker:
Yachetti, supra, note 12 at 304-5.
32. See Ontario Law Reform Commission Report, supra, note 12 at 24 and 12
Institute of Law Research and Reform, Expropriation, supra, note 12 at 7-9
33. (1913), 28 O.L.R. 20; 11 D.L.R. 529 (C.A.)
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by-law declaring the part of St. Clair Avenue on which the owner's
land fronted to be a "residential" street and prohibiting the erection
of any building within seventeen feet of the north and south lines of
the street. The arbitrator found that the real reason for passing this
by-law (as appeared from the evidence of the City Assessment
Commissioner) was that, as it was the intention of the City at a later
date to expropriate seventeen feet for the purpose of widening St.
Clair Avenue, it was deemed expedient to prevent buildings in the
meantime being placed in this seventeen feet. Such buildings, if
erected, would of course have increased the compensation which
would have to have been paid to the owners when the property was
expropriated ultimately.
This by-law was in force when the expropriating by-law was
passed on June 23, 1911, but was repealed on June 24, 1912. The
owner, of course, sought compensation on the basis that the highest
and best use of the expropriated land was as a site for commercial
buildings. The arbitrator found as a fact that such a use was not too
remote upon which to base a claim for compensation but
nevertheless limited his award to its value as residential property
because he felt that the restrictive by-law precluded him from
considering evidence of any higher use value.
On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, the owner argued on
two fronts: first, it was said that the use restricting by-law (the term
"zoning" apparently was not used at that time) was in fact part and
parcel of the expropriating machinery, and as such its effect in
restricting the use of the land could not be regarded; secondly, it
was argued that the arbitrator, if he did give weight to the by-law,
also should have considered the fact that the City of Toronto might
repeal the by-law.
The Court agreed with both of the claimant's arguments. As to
the first argument, Hodgins J.A., speaking for himself and two of
the three other judges, said:
The general scheme was widening St. Clair avenue by
exprorpiating this seventeen-foot strip and payment of the value
of the land to the land-owners. In anticipation of this, it is
asserted, by-law 5545 was passed to prevent buildings being
erected on the seventeen-foot strip [in the meantime]. If that was
its sole purpose, then, I think, it became part of the general
scheme and should be so treated [i.e., ignored] . . . .[The
expropriating] authority ought not to be able, by the exercise of
its other powers immediately prior to the taking, to reduce the
value of what it seeks and intends to acquire and of which it is
784 The Dalhousie Law Journal
contemplating expropriation. 34
It was really the claimant's second argument, however, to which
the Court gave more weight. It was held that, even if the by-law
could not be ignored as being part of the expropriation scheme and
was an independent legislative enactment (which was a question of
fact for the arbitrator alone to decide),
• . . the arbitrator erred in not considering the possibility or
likelihood of the consent of the City of Toronto being had by the
repeal of the by-law, either because of its temporary character or
on account of a change in the character of the locality.
3 5
This requirement, that an arbitrator must consider the possibility or
probability of a by-law being repealed or amended, was based
largely on the rationale of a leading English case, In re Lucas and
Chesterfield Gas and Water Board,3 6 which Hodgins J. A. accepted
as holding, inter alia, that:
. . . where a public body has obtained authority to expropriate
land, the special adaptability of which depends upon the consent
of the public body, the latter cannot eliminate from consideration
by the arbitrator that element of special adaptability, by asserting
that it can and will refuse its consent.
Hodgins J. A. then went on to say:
I do not think this case goes so far as to disable a public body
from asserting in an arbitration those private [sic] rights which it
possesses. But it is authority for the proposition that those private
rights which may give it a commanding position when the matter
comes to be dealt with practically, cannot be set up, if a market
exists, though it be limited in extent, as destroying the natural
adaptability of the site so that the arbitrator cannot consider the
possibility of those rights being reasonably used to promote,
instead of to defeat, the suggested use of the land. 
37
There have been several subsequent cases in which the thrust of
both arms of the Gibson case have been applied. Three of the more
interesting ones, which involved the "restriction as part of the
expropriation scheme" aspect, are Re Nanaimo-Duncan Utilities,38
Kramer v. Wascana Centre Authority,3 9 and Re Burkay Properties
Ltd. and Wascana Centre Authority. 
4 0
34. Id. at 28; 11 D.L.R. at 536
35. Id. at 27; 11 D.L.R. at 534-35
36. [1909] 1 K.B. 16(C.A.)
37. (1913), 28 O.L.R. 20 at 29; 11 D.L.R. 529 at 536
38. [195013 D.L.R. 461 (B.C.S.C.)
39. [1967] S.C.R. 237
40. (1972), 2 L.C.R. 9 (Sask. C.A.), rev'd (1973), 4 L.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.)
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In the Nanaimo case, 4 1 an electric utility was expropriated by the
British Columbia Power Commission. At the date of expropriation,
the claimant was faced with the necessity of expanding its facilities
in order to maintain the value of its undertaking. Some doubt was
cast upon the validity of water licences upon which the claimant
relied. Moreover, it could not expand without obtaining licences to
develop further power sites. It was contended by the Power
Commission that the government would not, in any event, allow
any development at the existing water site or any other available site
because it had then resolved to take the power of the whole of the
undeveloped and ungranted water powers for its use. Wilson" J. dealt
with the matter as follows:
The Government has, of course, and properly, a wide discretion
as to issuing licences for power development. This discretion is
to be used in the public interest. If the Government meant, as it
apparently did, to expropriate through its agent the Power
Commission, the properties of Nanaimo-Duncan Utilities, and to
supply the district with power from the Campbell River, it might
wisely withhold the issuing of a licence which would result in the
building of an unnecessary plant. It could only decently withhold
the issuing of a licence on that basis. If it did not intend to
provide a source of power for that district, it could not possibly
justify the refusal of a licence to the Company which served it.
4 2
He went on to hold that it was not the value of the property as it was,
sterilized by the refusal to grant further water licences, which was to
be awarded but the value as it would have been if there had been no
decision against granting further licences.
Kramer v. Wascana Centre Authority4 3 involved lands of the
claimant situated in the vicinity of the provincial Legislative
Building in Regina in an area described as one of unique
attractiveness for development. The property was governed by a
general subdivision by-law, No. 2356, which provided for use for
single detached dwellings. Subsequent amending by-laws permitted
a limited amount of local business use. A proposed development
plan for the area, involving high density residential, commercial
and other development, was submitted to the municipal authorities
by the claimant. This proposed development was approved in
principle but no amending by-laws were enacted to carry it into
effect. Rather, by-law No. 3506 was adopted, embodying a
41. [1950]3 D.L.R. 461
42. Id. at472-73
43. [1967]S.C.R. 237
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community planning scheme which called for the use of the lands
for "public park and open spaces". This was followed by a by-law,
No. 3618, which revoked the previous zoning by-law, No. 2356,
and provided that the lands would be designated for "public
service".
Under The Wascana Centre Act, 1962, 44 the Wascana Centre
Authority was given power to expropriate lands and, following the
adoption of the last mentioned by-law, the lands in question were
expropriated. The arbitrator found that the community planning
scheme adopted by by-law No. 3506 represented the state of mind
of the City authorities at the time of its enactment and that the
scheme was crystallized by zoning by-law No. 3618. The arbitrator
held on the evidence that this by-law was an independent
enactment, part of an overall city plan and not part of the
expropriation proceedings - although passed of course with
knowledge of the Wascana Centre Scheme. He held, therefore, that
the by-law No. 3618, in limiting the use of the land expropriated to
"public service use", was a determining factor in assessing the
amount of compensation which he fixed at $506,500.
The claimant appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, 45
the majority of which affirmed the finding of the arbitrator that the
value must be determined on "public service use", 46 but were of
the opinion that the arbitrator had fixed the value for such "public
service use" at too low an amount and accordingly increased the
award to $699,840. 47 Brownridge J. A. agreed with the majority as
to the amount, 48 but was of the opinion that, for the purpose of
finding the value of the lands, by-laws No. 3506 and No. 3618 and
The Wascana Centre Act should all have been considered not to
have been enacted, and that, therefore, the valuation should have
been fixed on the basis of the use permitted by the repealed by-law,
No. 2356, as amended by subsequent by-laws permitting local
business use, with whatever added value the possibility of
development in accordance with the proposed plan of subdivision of
the area would have given the lands. 4
44. S.S. 1962, c. 46
45. Unreported decision
46. Seejudgment of Abbott J. in the Supreme Court of Canada ([1967] S.C.R. 237
at 239)
47. Id. at 239 (the judgment of Spence J.)
48. Id. at 242
49. Id.
Compensation on Expropriation: The Effect of Zoning 787
On the claimant's appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 5° to
have the award further increased, Cartwright, Abbott, Martland and
Ritchie JJ. agreed with the majority in the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal that the arbitrator was right in basing the award on "public
service" use and dismissed the appeal. Spence J., on the other
hand, while agreeing that the award should not be increased,
preferred the view of Brownridge J. A. 51
While the reasoning of Spence J. is, in these circumstances,
obiter dicta at best, he was the only member of the Court to give any
insight into what sort of factors might render a zoning by-law "part
of the expropriating machinery" within the meaning of the Gibson
case. 52
During the course of his judgment, Spence J. pointed out
.. . that in order to be found to be part of the expropriating
machinery one does not need to determine that the limiting
by-laws were in any sense the result of a fradulent conspiracy to
deprive the owner of an award to which he was entitled.
53
In other words, it would appear that, if Spence J. is correct, it need
not be proved that the by-law was enacted in bad faith in the sense in
which that phrase is used in proceedings questioning the validity of
zoning by-laws. 
54
On the peculiar facts of the Kramer case, some of the factors
which Spence J. considered sufficient to indicate that the by-laws
there in question were part of the expropriating machinery are found
in the following extract from his judgment:
Although both by-law 3506 and by-law 3618 required the consent
of the Minister of Municipal Affairs, neither by-law received
such approval until [approximately four months before the date of
expropriation]. It is significant that by-law 3618 was enacted and
both by-laws were approved after the Wascana Centre Act had
50. Id.
51. Because of the fact that Brownridge J. A. had concurred in the actual dollar
award of the majority in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, it would appear that it
makes no difference what use a compensation award is based on. It should be
noted, however, that were it not for the fact that the development scheme originally
proposed by the claimant had only been approved in principle and that zoning
by-law No. 2356 as amended would not have permitted such uses (the development
therefore only being a possibility in the sense of the second arm of the Gibson
case), Brownridge J. A. would have awarded the claimant $1,500,000 instead of
$669,840. See [1967] S.C.R. 237 at 247-48
52. (1913), 28 O.L.R. 20; 11 D.L.R. 592 (C.A.)
53. [1967]S.C.R. 237 at 243
54. Supra, note 6
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been enacted. Under that statute, the Wascana Centre Authority
was created with three participating parties - the Province of
Saskatchewan, the City of Regina, and the University of
Saskatchewan. It will be realized that the latter two, although
independent legal entities, were in practical fact very much under
the control and guidance of the former . . . . The Wascana
Centre Act set up a master plan for the Wascana Centre and a
detailed scheme for land uses in the area composing the Wascana
Centre. As I have said, powers of expropriation were granted and
there were special references to the expropriation of the very
lands in issue on this appeal. . . .55
After mentioning the cost-sharing aspects of the scheme, he
concluded:
I am of the opinion that in view of the circumstances to which I
have referred above, one can only come to the conclusion that the
enactment of by-laws 3506 and 3618 was simply a step, in so far
as these lands are concerned, in setting up of the Wascana Centre
and the acquisition of the Wascana Centre Authority of the lands
in question. 
56
Statements such as this do little to clarify the general principles
upon which it can be decided whether a zoning by-law is part of the
expropriating machinery. Indeed, the same Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal which heard Kramer was faced with the same issue shortly
afterwards in an appeal from the same arbitrator in Re Burkay
Properties Ltd. and Wascana Centre Authority. 
57
The submissions in the Burkay Properties case were basically the
same as in Kramer; that is to say, the claimant in Burkay Properties
also argued that the arbitrator erred in determining that the value of
his expropriated property was to be based on its "public service
use" and submitted that the use permitted under by-law No. 3618
and the community planning scheme, considered in conjunction
with The Wascana Centre Act, should be treated merely as steps
leading to the acquisition by the Wascana Centre Authority of the
subject lands and therefore ignored for purposes of the award.
What was different about the Burkay Properties case, however,
was that the claimant there had new evidence of collaboration
between the Government of Saskatchewan, the City of Regina and
the University of Saskatchewan. This evidence was in the form of
testimony by one Preston, a planner, and the Director of Planning
55. [1967] S.C.R. 237 at 246
56. Id.
57. (1972), 2 L.C.R. 9 (Sask. C.A.), rev'd (1973), 4 L.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.)
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for the City of Regina during the relevant period. The Court found
that Preston's testimony concerning the formation of two
committees, the one consisting of the senior or elected representa-
tives of the three bodies just mentioned, and the other made up of
technical and professional personnel, coupled with the study
conducted by the latter, established a collaboration or co-operation
between the three parties resulting in a restricted permitted use of
the lands as ultimately reflected by by-law No. 3618.
Maguire J. A., in giving the judgment of the Court on this point,
said that he was applying the principles contained in the minority
reasons of Spence J. in the Kramer case. He especially took pains to
point out that
[this conclusion does not imply bad faith on the part of the city,
nor the other participating parties, in the development and
adoption of a scheme and subsequent legislation, all of which
were most commendable in their purpose. 58
Maguire J. A. also had occasion to comment on the Gibson case in
so far as it concerned the passing of the by-law there in question by
the City of Toronto immediately prior to the expropriation. He said:
There was not here, as in Re Gibson and City of Toronto, any
immediate purpose or intent to expropriate the subject lands, but
the certain intent was to control any development to the end that
the lands would be available for the use and purposes of Wascana
Centre Authority and its participating parties . . . . I am of the
opinion that the restricted use for the purpose of immediate
expropriation is not the determining factor. Such purpose does,
of course, make the application of the principle easy, but the
same result, affecting the value of the appellant's lands, occurs
under circumstances such as existing here, and a land owner
should not be left with the probable depreciated value, so
arising. 59
He culminated his decision on this portion of the case by saying:
This conclusion, by reason of the additional evidence here put in,
in my opinion, is not contrary to the decision of the majority of
the Supreme Court in Kramer et al. v. Wascana Centre
Authority, above referred to. 
60
But the saga of the Wascana Centre Authority does not end here.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal was merely the final resting
ground for the zoning by-law as "part of the expropriating
58. (1972),2L.C.R. 9at 16
59. Id. at 16
60. Id.
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machinery" aspect of the two "rules" in Re Gibson and City of
Toronto. The "possibility of rezoning" arm of the Gibson case also
came to be considered by the Supreme Court of Canada 6' in the
context of the Burkay Porperties case, but this time it was at the
instance of the Wascana Centre Authority as appellant. Before
discussing the details of this appeal, however, I should note two
earlier decisions dealing with "the possibility of rezoning".
The Supreme Court of Canada's first opportunity to consider the
"possibility of rezoning" rule came in Metro Toronto v. Valley
Improvement Co. 62 The issues in that case were numerous and
complex, but the relevant facts can be stated briefly.
The owner's property consisted of some ten acres on which it
carried on a restaurant business and proposed to build a motel with
an accompanying parking lot. Some plans had been made to that
end but no building permit had been sought nor had any application
been made for rezoning. The land was zoned "green belt" but its
use was a legal non-conforming one. About three and a half acres of
this land were expropriated by the Conservation Authority for flood
control purposes, and included in the land taken was the proposed
motel site and its accompanying parking area. A few years before
the expropriation, the municipality had passed a restrictive by-law
zoning the land in question against both residential and commercial
use but this by-law was given only limited approval by the
Municipal Board to a specified date which had expired before the
expropriation and no extension of approval had been sought.
The owner quite predictably claimed compensation on the basis
that the highest and best use of the subject lands was for the erection
of apartment buildings. The Ontario Municipal Board based its
$739 per acre award on the use permitted by the "green belt"
zoning, namely, only single-family detached dwellings each with a
minimum lot area of one acre. The Municipal Board had come to
the conclusion "that there was not a reasonable probability of the
desired zoning being realized" 63 and added nothing to the
compensation on the ground of possible rezoning.
The Ontario Court of Appeal was of the opinion that, if the
owner's lands were rezoned to permit the erection of apartment
houses, its lands would have a value of $40,000 per acre, but that
this value should be discounted by 331/3% because of the
61. (1973),4L.C.R. 59(S.C.C.)
62. [19631 S.C.R. 15; 35 D.L.R. (2d) 315
63. Id. at 22; 35 D.L.R. (2d) at 321
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"uncertainties and delays implicit in the necessity of obtaining
appropriate rezoning". 64
In laying down the principles which governed this aspect of the
case, Cartwright J., on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,
said:
.. . it is the duty of the tribunal to take into consideration the
probability or even the possibility of the rescission of any by-law
restricting the use to which the property may be put. 65
He cited, inter alia, Re Gibson and City of Toronto as authority
for this proposition. 66 He went on to say that whether such a
probability existed at the date of expropriation and, if it did exist, its
degree were both questions of fact on which the decision of the
Board was final unless in arriving at its decision it had erred in some
matter of law. 67 Because, in his view, the Ontario Court of Appeal
had reversed the Municipal Board's finding of the improbability of
obtaining a rezoning on a different inference from the facts,
Cartwright J. reinstated the Board's finding and, thus, limited the
owner to compensation based on "green belt" zoning. 68
The next case of interest on the question of the probability (or
possibility) of having a use restriction lifted is the Ontario Court of
Appeal decision in Teubner v. Minister of Highways. 6 9 There, the
claimant was the owner of certain agricultural lands bordering a
provincial highway which were subject to municipal restrictions
imposed under The Planning Act, 195570 preventing their use for
commercial purposes. The Highway Improvement Act 71 precluded
the issue of a permit for the desired development without the
consent of the Minister of Highways and the zoning classification
could not be changed without the approval of the Minister of
Planning and Development. The owner had made applications for
permits to establish a gasoline service station on part of the property
which was subsequently expropriated, but the permits had been
64. Id.
65. Id. at 27; 35 D.L.R. (2d) 325-26
66. Id.
67. Cartwright J.'s finding as to the finality of the Municipal Board's decision was
based on the privative clause found in The Conservation Authorities Act, then
R.S.O. 1960, c. 62, s. 25(10). It is interesting to note that, under the new Nova
Scotia Expropriation Act, S.N.S. 1973, c. 7, s. 60(1), appeals may be heard on any
question of law or fact or mixed law and fact.
68. [1963] S.C.R. 15 at 27-28; 35 D.L.R. (2d) 315 at 326
69. [196512 O.R. 221; 50D.L.R. (2d) 195 (C.A.)
70. Then, S.O. 1955, c. 61
71. Then, R.S.O. 1960, c. 171, s. 34(2) (a)
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allowed to lapse. Before the date of expropriation, the owner once
more applied for the necessary permits, but this time they were
refused because of the possible impact which their granting might
have on the highway projects that were then in contemplation.
The claimant first sought to have the Court ignore the refusal by
the Minister of Highways to grant the necessary permits on the
grounds that such refusal was merely "part of the expropriating
machinery" within the meaning of the first "rule" in the Gibson
case and also on the basis of the Nanaimo-Duncan case. However,
these arguments were rejected:
[T]here is a real difference between zoning down a property by
positive action to reduce its value before expropriation (the
Gibson case) and refusing to give some consent which the owner
needs to increase the value and without which it has a lower
value. 72
As to the question of the possibility of the Minister of Highways
granting the permits (which Roach J. A. found had been refused
validly because of the inconvenience which would result when and
if the highway projects then in contemplation were completed), it
was held:
The depressing effect of the prohibition imposed by [The
Highway Improvement Act] should be measured by determining
how much less a purchaser would pay for that highway frontage
and take a chance on being able to obtain the necessary permit
than he would be willing to pay if there were no prohibition.
British American Oil Co. Ltd. was not at all interested unless it
could get the necessary permit and neither was the Shell Oil Co.
Whatever amount that should be should be deducted from the
valuation made by the appraisers because their valuations were
based on the premise that the permit or permits would be granted.
The Board proceeded on the same footing. Giving the matter my
best consideration, I would, for the reasons stated, discount those
valuations by 35%.73
It is indeed difficult to ascertain from the reasons stated the basis
on which Roach J.A. considered that there was a 65% probability
72. [196512 O.R. 221 at 233; 50 D.L.R. (2d) 195 at 207. In a rather confusing, if
not incomprehensible, part of his judgment, Roach J.A., while willing to give
every possible power to the Minister of Highways to restrict the value of the
claimant's land, made it quite clear that any similar attempt to do so by the Minister
of Planning and Development under The Planning Act could be ignored in
determining the basis for compensation (at 229-30; 50 D.L.R. (2d) at 203-04). This
decision has also been criticized by Manning, supra, note 17 at 40.
73. Id. at 234; 50 D.L.R. (2d) at 208
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that the permits would have in fact been granted had the land in
question not been expropriated. Perhaps, although it is by no means
clear, this was a mere application of what Cartwright J. in Metro
Toronto v. Valley Improvement Co. said it was duty of the tribunal
to do; namely, to "take into consideration the probability or even
the possibility of the rescission of any by-law . . . .[emphasis
added]".74
Notwithstanding the real difficulties in choosing a percentage
figure, this practice of "discounting for the chance", as was
adopted by Roach J. A. in the Teubner case, may not be too
objectionable as a method of doing "rough justice" to the claimant.
Nor is the practice totally unfounded in principle, although
ostensibly the finding of a 65% chance of obtaining development
permits from the Minister of Highways appears to fly in the face of
the earlier finding that such a permit had already been refused
without the slightest intimation that it would be granted in future.
The principle that mitigates the apparent absurdity of such situations
is one of long standing, at least under the "value to the owner"
approach to value. This principle is perhaps best identified in the
following passage from the judgment of Duff J. in Cunard v. The
King:
One principle by which the courts have always governed
themselves in estimating the compensation to be awarded for
property taken under compulsory powers is this: you are to apply
yourself to the consideration of the circumstances as if the
scheme under which the compulsory powers are exercised had no
existence. The proper application of that principle. . . seems to
me to be this - you are to estimate the value of the property as if
the property were not required for the public purposes to which
the Minister, who is taking the proceedings, intends to devote it.
The circumstance that it is so required is not to enter into the
computation of value as either enhancing or diminishing it.75
This principle is, of course, merely a specific application of the
well-entrenched policy of the courts in expropriation matters
reiterated well by Rand J. in Diggon-Hibben Ltd. v. The King in the
following terms:
A compensation statute should not be approached with the
attitude that Parliament intended an individual to be victimized in
loss because of the accident that his land rather than his
74. [1963] S.C.R. 15 at 27; 35 D.L.R. (2d) 315 at 325-26
75. (1910),43 S.C.R. 88at99-100
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neighbour's should be required for public purposes .... 76
When Roach J.A.'s decision in Teubner is looked at from this
point of view it becomes much more palatable. Before the
conception of the highway project which eventually led to the
expropriation, the Minister of Highways had once granted the
permits which were allowed to lapse. If the highway project is
deemed to have no existence for purposes of compensation, it
becomes a matter of more reasonable speculation that the Minister
might have, once again, granted the permits.
It was just this sort of speculation, however, that caused the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's decision in Re Burkay Properties
Ltd. and Wascana Centre Authority to be reversed on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada. 7 7 As indicated earlier, the Saskatchewan
Court's refusal to follow, in Burkay Properties, its own decision in
the Kramer case on the issue of whether by-laws No. 3506 and No.
3618 where part of the expropriating machinery was not disturbed
by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, after finding that these
by-laws could be ignored in assessing the compensation payable,
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had still to consider the
possibility of rezoning.
This latter issue arose in the Burkay Properties case by virtue of
the fact that the claimant's lands had, prior to the Wascana Centre
scheme, been zoned Argricultural A2, under by-law No. 2848
passed in 1956, some eight years before the date of expropriation. It
may be noted that the A2 zone permitted only limited commercial
use and, while single-family residences were permitted, these were
restricted to ten-acre sites. In addition to this restriction, the
claimant's land had come under general "Interim development
control" in 1958, imposed under the provisions of The Community
Planning Act, 1957.78 This was found, quite rightly, by the
arbitrator and by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to be an
independent measure implemented as a matter of general benefit to
the whole city. Under the terms of this scheme no application for
development could be approved unless it conformed with the
community plan being prepared. 79
76. [1949]S.C.R.712at715;[194914D.L.R.785at787
77. (1972), 2 L.C.R. 9 (Sask. C.A.), rev'd (1973), 4 L.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.)
78. S.S. 1957, c. 48
79. This form of development control is not unlike that current in the Halifax area
at the present time with the Municipal Development Plan in the process of being
prepared; here no development can be undertaken unless it conforms with the
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Although the owner based his claim for compensation on the
property's value for a multi-family residential use, it appeared from
the evidence that he had never made any application for a
development permit. The Court, therefore, had to face the now
familiar problem of determining, as Roach J.A. said in the Teubner
case, how much less a purchaser would pay for the property and
take a chance on being able to obtain the necessary permit than he
would be willing to pay if there were no prohibition.
In delivering the judgment of the Court on this issue, Magurie
J.A. said:
By reason of the subsequent collaboration between the three
bodies referred to, it is difficult to measure the probabilities, but I
think it must be inferred that the community planning scheme,
considered by itself with its initial purpose, raises a definite
probability that the zoning required by the appellant to permit its
suggested development would not have beet) approved nor
granted by the city. 80
Later, after discussing the deductions that would have to be made on
account of sewer services, road access, inter alia, he siid:
There falls to be deducted some item to cover the probability that
full potential for this property would not be realized on the
ground, as earlier stated, that the community planning scheme as
initiated might well have restricted the permitted uses. I must
arbitrarily set an amount. In an endeavour to conservatively do
so, I set a 15% reduction.
8 1
This fixing of an 85% chance of obtaining the desired zoning,
caused the award to be increased from $126,150, as awarded by the
arbitrator on the basis of "public service" use, to $159,060.
The Wascana Centre Authority's appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada was allowed by a unanimous decision of all five judges who
heard the case. In a less than one-page decision delivered orally by
Martland J., the Court recited Maguire J.A.'s conclusion,82 that
there was a definite probability that the necessary zoning and
development permit would not be granted, and said:
In our view, with respect, the Court erred in resting its judgment
on an event which it had concluded would probably not arise. 83
Regional Development Plan, which, while not intended to provide "interim
controls in and of municipal planning", may have that effect in some situations.
80. (1972),2L.C.R.9at 19
81. Id. at22
82. (1972),2L.C.R. 9at 10
83. (1973),4L.C.R. 59at60
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While it is no doubt true that the phrase "definite probability", as
used by Maguire J.A., was a poor choice of words, it is submitted
that he later clarified this statement by fixing the 15% discount
figure. What the Supreme Court of Canada did, in effect, was
ignore its own previous ruling in Metro Toronto v. Valley
Improvement Co. 8 4 that it is the duty of the tribunal to take into
consideration the probability or even the possibility of the rescission
of a restrictive zoning by-law. On the other hand, in fairness to the
Supreme Court, as has been implicit in the discussion up to this
point, none of the cases considered, including Gibson and Metro
Toronto, are really instructive as to what test is to be applied in
determining whether there is a possibility or probability of obtaining
a rezoning. Indeed, even more basically, the courts have not even
chosen between "probability" and "possibility"; rather they have
used both terms interchangeably and, on occasion, have substituted
such words as "likelihood" (Gibson) and "chance" (Teubner). In
light of such confusion and uncertainty, however, it is perhaps all
the more unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not take the
opportunity presented to it in Burkay Propeties to give some
guidance in the matter.
There is also a further question as to the type of evidence required
in the practical application of what I have called the two "rules" in
Re Gibson and City of Toronto. In the Gibson case itself, I noted
that the City's "real reason" for passing the restrictive by-law was
determined by the testimony of the City Assessment Commissioner.
In the Kramer case, Spence J. felt aided in determining whether the
restrictive zoning by-laws were part of the expropriating machinery
by the chronological sequence of the enactment of the by-laws in
relation to the creation of the Wascana Centre Authority and the fact
that, of the three bodies involved, the province of Saskatchewan
was really the controlling organ. On the question of the possibility
of rezoning, Roach J.A., in deciding the Teubner case, was inclined
to look favourably on the claimant's (or his theoretical purchaser's)
chances of obtaining development permits by reason of evidence of
the fact that he had been granted such permits before. Similarly, in
Burkay Porperties, Maguire LA. had had regard to the evidence of
the property's potential for development and to the history and
purpose of the community planning scheme, but, in the end, was
forced to decide the possibility of rezoning arbitrarily.
84. [1963]S.C.R. 15; 33 D.L.R. (2d) 315
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This difficult question concerning the type of evidence admissible
in applying the two "rules" was actually one of the questions
submitted on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Metro
Toronto v. Valley Improvement Co. The Ontario Municipal Board,
in the course of its decision, has used the expressions, "the
municipality's intent as to the future use of this property", and "the
thinking of the Conservation Authority of the corporation as to the
ultimate use of the land".
In answer to the question as to whether the use of such expression
constituted an error by the Board, Cartwright J. quoted8 5 the
following passage from Lord Sumner in Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners v. Fisher's Executors, which he said was applicable to all
corporate bodies:
In any case desires and intentions are things of which a company
is incapable. These are the mental operations of its shareholders
and officers. The only intention, that the company has, is such as
is expressed in or necessarily follows from its proceedings. It is
hardly a paradox to say that the form of a company's resolutions
and instruments is their substance. 
8 6
Having cited this passage, however, Cartwright J. then went on to
point out that:
On the same page Lord Sumner refers to cases in which Atkin
L.J., as he then was, used the expression "the intention of the
company" and Viscount Cave spoke of "the last thing which the
company. . . desired".
87
The judge held that, looking at the Board's reasons as a whole, he
did not think that they had erred in law. Rather he said, rather aptly:
"If they erred in their choice of words they appear to have done so
in good company". 8 8
To sum up, then, the cases so far considered appear to present
two major problem areas for further consideration: first, there is the
problem of identifying the essence of the probabilty/possibility of
rezoning "rule" and, secondly, assuming a satisfactory test can be
formulated, what type of evidence can properly be used in applying
the test to be given set of facts? An evidentiary problem is also, of
course, raised by the problem of determining whether a zoning
by-law is an independent enactment or merely a part of the
85. Id. at 31; 35 D.L.R. (2d) at 330
86. [1926]A.C. 395at411 (H.L.)
87. [1963]S.C.R. 15at32;35D.L.R. (2d)315at330
88. Id.; 35 D.L.R. (2d) at 331
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expropriating machinery. 89
In an attempt to shed at least some light on these problem areas, it
is useful to consider briefly some of the more recent compensation
cases, the majority of which are decisions of the Ontario Land
Compensation Board, but there is also a recent decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal.
Re Farlinger Developments Ltd. & Borough of East York, 90 the
Ontario Court of Appeal decision, has considerable significance.
This is so for a number of reasons: first, the compensation award
was based on the "market value" approach to compensation under
Ontario's recently codified compensation provisions; secondly,
there is some indication given as to how the "independent
enactment" versus "part of the expropriating machinery" issue
might be circumvented as a matter of interpretation under the new
compensation codes; thirdly, the Ontario Court of Appeal makes a
clear statement regarding the possibility/probability of rezoning rule
and; fourthly, the evidential aspects of determining the probability
of rezoning are exemplified.
The facts are rather detailed but at least a cursory review of them
is necessary for a proper understanding of the Court's decision.
Basically, the lands expropriated (the Goulding property) comprised
6.517 wooded acres in the south-east portion of the Borough of East
York and included a large single-family residence. The Goulding
property was adjacent to another 2.89 acre lot which was relevant to
the case and which was known as the McLean property. There were
also extensive apartment developments to the north, west and south
of the Goulding property.
The zoning history of the property dated back to 1962 and official
plan amendment No. 4, which consolidated and rewrote the general
policies for development in East York. At the time when official
plan amendment No. 4 was being considered, East York had sought
to have both the McLean property and the Goulding property
designated as public open space. However, when the amendment
was approved in its final form and implemented by by-law No.
6752, a comprehensive zoning by-law, both the Goulding property
89. Outside of the legislative reform, infra, it would appear to be a difficult task to
devise a better test than that contained in the Gibson case, as explained by Spence
J. in the Kramer case.
90. (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 553; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 193; 8 L.C.R. 112 (sub nom.
Farlinger v. Borough of East York) (C.A.). Applications for leave to appeal were
refused by both the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. See
(1975),9L.C.R. 10
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and the McLean property were designated R-1. Official plan
amendment No. 4 also contemplated that each community in the
Borough would be subject to a "Secondary Plan" and, while such
plans were being prepared, all developments were subject to
extensive controls. Official plan amendment No. 4 also contained
the policy statement that areas zoned for apartment dwelling
generally would be separated from areas zoned for very low density
residential uses.
Official plan amendment No. 5, adopted in 1964, did not relate
directly to the subject property but changed the use of some lands
nearby from industrial to residential use (high density, medium
density and low density).
On November 20, 1963, McWilliam, the Planning Commissioner
for East York, was told by the Metropolitan Parks Department that
the McLean property and the Goulding property should be acquired
by East York for park purposes. On March 23, 1964, the Council of
East York approved the purchase of the McLean property.
On August 20, 1965, Farlinger entered into an agreement of
purchase and sale with Mrs. Goulding to acquire the Goulding
property for $150,000. On September 7, 1965, Farlinger advised
McWilliam of its purchase. The Council of East York met on
September 8, 1965, and adopted by-law No. 7562 expropriating the
Goulding property. East York, however, failed to register a plan of
exprorpriation which was a condition precedent to the vesting of the
Goulding property in East York. On October 5, 1965, the Council
of East York adopted report No. 12 of the Parks and Recreation
Committee, instructing its solicitor to inform Farlinger that the
Goulding property was zoned R- I and that Council had no intention
of changing it.
Official plan amendments No. 6, No. 7 and No. 10 followed in
the years 1966, 1967, and 1969, the result of these being that the
Goulding property was reserved as public open space.
In early 1970, East York discovered the defective nature of its
expropriation proceedings and, by agreement with Farlinger dated
March 11, 1970, allowed the effective date for determining
compensation to be fixed at September 15, 1969 and Farlinger
waived certain procedural provisions of The Expropriations Act,
1968-69.91
When the question of compensation came to be decided by the
91. S.O. 1968-69, c. 36, ss. 6, 9, 10 and 25(1) (now R.S.O. 1970, c. 154)
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Land Compensation Board in 1973 there were two main issues
considered:
(a) what was the highest and best use of the Goulding property
- a single-family residential development in accordance with
the existing R-1 zoning, or a high density apartment
development. The parties agreed that if the highest and best use
was as a site for single-family residential use, then its market
value was $360,000.
(b) if the highest and best use was for a high density apartment
development then what should be the amount of compensation
to be paid?
92
In addition to the records of the zoning by-laws and of the
amendments to the official plan, the Board had the assistance of the
opinions of three professional planners, two traffic experts, and four
appraisers in deciding these issues.
As to the highest and best use of the property, the majority of the
Board chose to rely on the evidence of Farlinger's planner who
concluded that the Goulding site, if not expropriated, would have
been used best residentially and for a higher density use, namely, a
600 suite apartment building. The Board agreed with this planner
that the Goulding property was designated R- I as a holding zone
and that this designation was not a deterrent to its possibilities for
another use if that use was shown to be a proper one. The Board also
accepted the view of this planner that, considering the relevant
zoning by-laws as of September 19, 1965, including official plan
amendment No. 7, it was clear that the area had, in a general sense,
been identified as an area of potential high density residential
development and, indeed, was progressing rapidly towards
fulfilment of these policies. The Board further preferred the opinion
of Farlinger's traffic expert that a 600 suite apartment would not be
judged improper because of traffic aspects.
Regarding the market value of the property for high density
residential use, the majority of the Board more or less split the
differences among the four appraisers. It is interesting to note that,
as well as giving evidence as to the proper discount in value for the
delay that would be encountered in making an application for
rezoning, the majority of the appraisers also gave opinions as to the
discount a purchaser would require in view of the risk that rezoning
might not be obtained. On account of these two factors, the majority
92. (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 553 at 559; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 193 at 199; 8 L.C.R. 112 at
118
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of the Board discounted 15% and 35%, respectively, and ended up
granting Farlinger an award of $982,900.
The principal issue in East York's appeal to the Ontario Court of
Appeal was whether the majority of the Board erred in concluding
that the highest and best use of the Goulding property was as a high
density apartment development.
In that Court, Howland J.A. found that, by virtue of the
agreement between East York and Farlinger, the compensation was
to be determined in accordance with the provision of The
Expropriations Act, 1968-69, the relevant sections of which he
considered to be:
93
13. (2) Where the land of the owner is expropriated, the
compensation payable to the owner shall be based
upon,
(a) the market value of the land;
14. (1) The market value of land expropriated is the amount
that the land might be expected to realize if sold in the
open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer.
(4) In determining market value of land, no account shall
be taken of,
(a) the special use to which the expropriating authority
will put the land;
(b) any increase or decrease in the value of the land
resulting from the imminence of the development in
respect of which the expropriation is made or from
any imminent prospect of expropriation.
After noting that, because of East York's initially defective
expropriation, the expropriation procedure was not completed until
the execution of the "expropriation agreement" in March, 1970,
the judge, in a somewhat confusing manner, went on to say that the
designation of the Goulding property as public lands in the official
plan amendments No. 7 and No. 10 was to be ignored for purposes
of compensation. 94 This was confusing because it was not made
clear whether this was due solely to the fact that the effective date
93. Id. at 562; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 202; 8 L.C.R. at 120. It will be noted that the
substance of these provisions is identical to sections 27(1) and 33(a) and (c) of the
Expropriation Act, 1973, S.N.S. 1973, c. 7.
94. Id. at 563; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 203; 8 L.C.R. at 120
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for assessing compensation (September 15, 1969), as fixed by the
agreement, antedated the adoption of the amendments (September
18, 1969) or, whether it was also based on the principles contained
in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (4) in section 14. He did say,
however, that:
With reference to s. 14(4) (a) and (b) it would be basically unfair
if the market value of an owner's property could be reduced by
the decision of the expropriating authority to downgrade it to a
use which had less value. 95
If Howland J.A. meant this to be an interpretation of sections
14(4) (a) and (b), then based on such an interpretation, those
provisions not only cover situations where the open market value is
affected by the fact of expropriation (as was suggested earlier in this
article), but also govern situations where the market value may be
affected not by the fact of expropriation but by the fact of zoning. I
would argue that it is clearly not the intent of sections 14(4) (a) and
(b); if it were, it would mean that a municipality could never affect
the value of private property prior to its expropriation, even when
this was done independently, as a general measure, in the best
interests of a community. 96 The fact that Alberta and Manitoba,
which apparently thought that it was right that land values not be so
affected, felt it necessary to expressly protect them in this regard
also creates doubts about the correctness of Howland J.A.'s
interpretation. Moreover, although it seems that it cannot be used as
an aid in judicial interpretation, 97 the Report of the Ontario Law
Reform Commission, in which sections 14 (4) (a) and (b) were
recommended, makes it clear that the Commission never intended
to change the law relating to the effect of down-zoning prior to
expropriation. 98
The real value of Howland J.A. 's decision in the Farlinger case,
however, does not lie in his comments on the first "rule" in Re
Gibson and City of Toronto, which in any case were merely obiter
dicta. 99 What was important about his decision was his ruling on the
95. Id.
96. See e.g. Kramer v. Wascana Centre Authority, [1967] S.C.R. 237
97. The weight of authority would seem to be against the use of such materials as
evidence of intention. However, see E. A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) at 128, where he refers to two seemingly conflicting
House of Lords' decisions on the point.
98. Supra, note 12 at 21
99. This, of course, is because of the fact that the relevant date for assessing
compensation was prior in time to the adoption of official plan amendments No. 7
and No. 10.
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question of the possibility/probability of rezoning. On this issue,
after reviewing some of the authorities already discussed in this
article, he said:
• . . the highest and best use must be based on something more
than a possibility of rezoning. There must be a probability or a
reasonable expectation that such rezoning will take place. It is not
enough that the lands have the capability of rezoning. In my
opinion, probability connotes something more than a 50%
possibility. 100
On the facts before him, Howland J.A. then held:
A consideration of the probability of rezoning the Goulding
property from R-1 to permit a high density apartment
development involved a consideration of two principle matters:
(a) the suitability of the Goulding property for a more intensive
use than was permitted by R-1 zoning.
(b) the intention of the Council of East York and of the Ontario
Municipal Board as shown by their respective acts and
statements. '01
Then, with respect to the suitability of the property for a high
density apartment dwelling, Howland J.A. was content to accept the
Board's opinion, based as it was, on the evidence of the planner and
the traffic expert retained by Farlinger. 1
0 2
On the problem of determining the intentions of the Council of
East York and the Ontario Municipal Board, the judge felt that he
was confronted with a much more difficult issue. 10 3 One of the
considerations rendering this problem a difficult one was the fact
that section 35 (22) of The Planning Act 10 4 provided that:
Where an application to the council for an amendment to a
by-law. . . is refused or the council refuses or neglects to make a
decision within one month . . . the applicant may appeal to the
Municipal Board and the Municipal Board shall hear the appeal
and dismiss the same or direct that the by-law be amended in
accordance with its order.
While Howland J.A. recognized implicitly that this provision in
The Planning Act gave the expropriated property owner a notional
100. (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 553 at 566; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 193 at 206; 8 L.C.R. 112 at
123
101. Id. at 567; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 207; 8 L.C.R. at 123-24
102. Id. at 567; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 207; 8 L.C.R. at 125
103. Id.
104. R.S.O. 1970, c. 349. It should be noted that section 39 of the Planning Act,
S.N.S. 1969, c. 16, gives an applicant a similar right of appeal to the Planning
Appeal Board.
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second opportunity to obtain a rezoning, he chose, presumably for
reasons quite understandable in terms of proof, to ignore the duty
which he had placed on himself of considering the intentions of the
Ontario Municipal Board. 1
0 5
As to the question of the intention of the Council of East York, he
concluded that
• . . there [was] not sufficient evidence to justify the reasonable
expectation of the majority of the Board that rezoning would take
place to permit a high density apartment development. '
0 6
The major reasons which led the Court to this conclusion can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Official plan amendment No. 4 did not indicate any intention to
vary the low density zoning but rather indicated, as a matter of
policy, that areas zoned for apartment development generally
would be separated from areas zoned for low or very low
density residential uses;
(2) A "secondary plan" amendment and official plan amendment,
or at least a special study followed by a site plan by-law, would
have been required before a rezoning of the Goulding property;
(3) The word "possibilities" used by Farlinger's planner, fell short
of what was required to conclude that there was a probability of
the property being rezoned for a high density apartment
development.
It is interesting to note that Howland J.A. did not consider that
the planners were incompetent to give evidence as to the probable
intention of the Council. On the contrary he had said earlier in his
judgment that:
The determination of highest and best use, including as part and
parcel thereof the probability of rezoning, is a matter on which
the evidence of experts in the field of planning was required. '
0 7
The judge did not seem to have much doubt as to the
105. Howland J.A.'s neglect to consider the intentions of the Ontario Municipal
Board can perhaps be partially justified on the grounds that the Municipal Board
had, as is required under The Planning Act, already approved official plan
amendment No. 4 and by-law No. 6752 under which the Goulding property had
been zoned R-1. It should be noted, however, that there is no similar requirement
for Planning Appeal Board approval of zoning by-laws under the Nova Scotia
Planning Act.
106. (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 553 at 567; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 193 at 207; 8 L.C.R. 112 at
125
107. Id. at 566-67; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 206-07; 8 L.C.R. at 124
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appropriateness of considering the opinions of planners in reaching
his decision on the probability of rezoning. Similarly, arbitrators
generally rely on such opinions. However, at least one lawyer has
had serious reservations about the practice. H.E. Manning, Q.C.,
writing in Chitty's Law Journal, posed the following questions:
Who are planners anyhow? Is there a mystique of planning? Can
a planner give evidence of probabilities relating to his profession
which clearly it would be idiotic to permit a lawyer to give as to
law, or even a doctor to give as to changes expected or demanded
by him in medical philosophy?108
Mr. Manning would no doubt be even more disturbed by the recent
decision of the Ontario Land Compensation Board in Spruceside
Construction Ltd. v. City of Hamilton, 109 where the Farlinger case
was cited in extending to appraisers competency t6 give evidence in
relation to the probability of rezoning. 110
Even if it is conceded that the evidence of planners and appraisers
in relation to the probability of rezoning does not deserve such
strong criticism, the admission of such opinions to determine the
future intentions of a municipal corporation is going far beyond a
determination of intention from what is expressed in, or necessarily
follows from, the proceedings of such corporations. 1 '
In any event, notwithstanding that a finding on the probability of
obtaining a rezoning is a highly speculative and arbitrary process
and one which operates largely on the basis of opinions in the nature
of second-guessing by planners and appraisers, the Ontario Land
Compensation Board has apparently not been deterred from
attempting to grapple with the issue when it has arisen in an
increasing number of cases. For example, in Hebron Investments
Ltd. v. Scarborough Board of Education, 112 where the claimant's
lands were zoned commercial, but where its claim was based on a
probable rezoning to permit high density residential uses, the Board
reasoned as follows:
The Board has carefully considered the evidence of the two
planners, . . . the evidence as to the history of the applications,
108. Supra, note 17 at41
109. (1975), 9 L.C.R. 128 (Ont.)
110. Id. at 135
111. See the quotation from Lord Sumner in Inland Revenue Commissioners v.
Fisher's Executers , [1926] A.C. 395 at 411 (H.L.), cited in Metro Toronto v.
Valley Improvement Co., [1963] S.C.R. 15 at 31; 35 D.L.R. (2d) 315 at 330
112. (1973), 3 L.C.R. 356 (Ont. L.C.B.)
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and the attitude of the planning staff and the Planning Board,
together with the able submissions of counsel.
In the result, the Board, using its best judgment, has come to the
conclusion that the reasonable man in the market place ...
would probably decide that the highest and best potential of this
property, from an economic standpoint, was for [a high density
residential development], and hence would conclude that a
rezoning to permit such a use could reasonably have been
expected to have been approved at some level. 113
The Board went on to base its award on a high density residential
use with a deduction of 25% for the risk of not obtaining rezoning.
In another case, Havlik v. Essex Separate School Board,114 the
Land Compensation Board turned the probability of rezoning issue
on its head. At the date of expropriation, the claimant's property
was not officially zoned but in the official plan affecting the town in
which it was situated, the proposal for zoning was rural R-2,
permitting only single family dwellings (and only those when used
by a farmer farming on the lot). In order to be effective the by-law
would have had to be approved by the Ontario Municipal Board.
The Board concluded:
In the instant case there was no evidence as to the possibility or
probability of approval of [the by-law] by the Ontario Municipal
Board. As there had been no zoning regulations in Kingsville
prior [to the expropriation date], in the absence of approval by the
Ontario Municipal Board, this Board must approach the
determination of market value in this case on the basis that there
was no effective zoning. . . . By reason of its location within the
town and the relative activity in subdivisions . . . the Board has
no difficulty in finding that the subject property had a very
definite potential for residential development at the date of
expropriation. "
5
No deduction was made for the possibility that the by-law might be
approved.
A further variation on this theme can be found in Genman
Holdings Ltd. v. New Mount Sinai Hospital.1 16 Here, a zoning
by-law, which would have allowed the claimant to build a high
density commercial development (and upon which basis he later
claimed compensation), was objected to by the expropriating
authority at the Ontario Municipal Board approval stage. The Board
113. Id. at 375
114. (1975), 7 L.C.R. 354(Ont. L.C.B.)
115. Id. at 359
116. (1973),4L.C.R. 223 (Ont. L.C.B.)
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held that, since the authority's opposition to rezoning was not based
on proper planning principles, but on the prospect of expropriation,
the claimant should be compensated on the basis that the rezoning
would be approved. 117
The cases discussed disclose some of the problems in the current
approach of arbitrators, compensation tribunals and the courts to the
problem of use restrictions on expropriated property. With these in
mind, it is useful to consider some of the legislative reforms that
have been adopted in an attempt to ameliorate the situation.
IV. Legislative Reforms
In discussing the Farlinger case, I argued that Howland J.A. must
have misinterpreted sections 14(4) (a) and (b) of the Ontario
Expropriations Act (sections 33(a) and (c) of the equivalent Nova
Scotia Act) when he said that, in light of those provisions, it would
be basically unfair (and, thus, presumably contrary to the section)
for an expropriating authority to downgrade a claimant's property to
a use which has less value. Assuming he was incorrect in this, it
merits repeating that, of all Canadian jurisdictions, only Alberta and
Manitoba have taken any legislative steps to correct the confusion
caused by the first "rule" in Re Gibson and City of Toronto,118 as
explained by Spence J. in Kramer v. Wascana Centre Authority1 19
and by Maguire J.A. in Re Burkay Properties Ltd. and Wascana
Centre Authority. 12
0
The form of the provision in the Alberta Expropriation Act 1 12 is
as follows:
43. In determining the value of the land, no account shall be
taken of
(e) any increase or decrease in value which results from the
imposition or amendment of a zoning by-law, land use
117. For further examples of cases in which the compensation award was based on
a higher use than that allowed by the current zoning with a deduction being made
for the risk, see: Lazarowich v. Minister of Highways for Ontario (1971), 1 L.C.R.
198 (Ont. C.A.); Linat Holdings Ltd. v. Minister of Highways for Ontario (1970),
I L.C.R. 289 (Ont. Mun. Bd.); Whittier Park Development Corp. v. City of
Winnipeg, [1974] 4 W.W.R. 236; 6 L.C.R. 322 (Man. C.A.)
118. (1913), 28 O.L.R. 20; 11 D.L.R. 592 (Ont. C.A.)
119. [1967]S.C.R. 237 at 243
120. (1972),2L.C.R. 9at 16
121. S.A. 1974, c. 27
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classification or analogous enactment made with a view of the
development under which the land is expropriated.
In the Manitoba Expropriation Act, 122 the section reads:
27.(2) In determining the due compensation payable to the owner
no account shall be taken of
(c) any depreciation of the value of the land which is
attributable to the fact that, whether by way of designation,
allocation or other particulars contained in a development plan
published by any government of government authority or
whether by any other means, an indication has been given that
the land is, or is likely, to be acquired by any authority.
While the wording of the provision in the Manitoba Act is slightly
wider on its face, it is quite clear that it, as well as section 43(e) of
the Alberta Act, was designed to prevent an expropriated party from
bearing the cost of a public dedision to expropriate his property
rather than that of his neighbour. In other words, under either of
these provisions, it is no longer necessary for a claimant to prove
that the down-zoning was a "part of the expropriating machinery"
within the meaning of the Wascana cases; rather, in any ordinary
case, it should be sufficient to prove that the use restriction was
imposed prior to the expropriation and that the nature of the
permitted use in itself points to a public development. 123
It should be noted that these provisions do not speak in any way
to the issue of the probability of rezoning. That this is so is probably
best illustrated by the 1974 decision of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal in Whittier Park Development Corp. v. City of Winnipeg. '
24
In that case, the claimant's lands had for some time been zoned
M.2-light industrial and F-Flood Plain, neither of which permitted
residential uses. It was found as a fact that the claimant had sought
rezoning to allow the development of a rental housing project and
that the City had refused at least partially on the basis that the land
might be required for a major highway programme, for which
122. S.M. 1970, c. 78
123. An example of such a situation might be the designation of Hemlock Ravine
as "park and recreational" under the Halifax-Dartmouth Regional Development
Plan. It would be more difficult, however, to prove that the restriction was imposed
with "a view to the development under which the land is expropriated" in a case
where the land has been zoned R-1 and then expropriated by a public housing
authority. In this case the permitted use per se does not point to a public
development.
124. [1974] 2 W.W.R. 236; 6 L.C.R. 322 (Man. C.A.)
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purpose it was ultimately expropriated.
Notwithstanding that the facts were particularly strong in this
case, in the sense that the City had frozen deliberately the use of the
claimant's land, the Court was content, in doing justice to the
claimant, to hold that there was a probability of rezoning to the
desired use, subject to a 15% discount for the risk of not obtaining
it. That is to say, even though it was armed with section 27(2) (c),
the Court was not willing to say that the effect of the City's refusal
to rezone was tantamount to a depreciation of the value of the land
by a means which indicated that the land was likely to be acquired
by it.
It is plain, therefore, that the additional provisions contained in
the Alberta and Manitoba expropriation statutes are of very narrow
application and that, even where they do apply, they do not alter
significantly the law under the first "rule" in Re Gibson and City of
Toronto, as developed by the Wascana cases.
It is often said by those proposing reforms in this area, especially
in the field of rezoning, that perhaps it might be advisable to adopt
some of the provisions of English expropriation law. 125 While it is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the law of compulsory
purchase in the United Kingdom, it may suffice to point out that the
Land Compensation Act 126 of that jurisdiction is tied in inextricably
to a highly sophisticated and complex history of land use control.
For example, it would be folly to adopt the English provisions
which preclude an expropriated party from claiming compensation
on higher than existing use value, without also adopting the
"assumed planning permission" scheme. 127
V. Summary and Conclusion
It was mentioned at the outset that the purpose of this article was to
lay a foundation for determining how the Nova Scotia Expropria-
tions Compensation Board might deal, in its compensation awards,
with the questions raised by the presence of land use restrictions on
125. See, Institute of Law Research and Reform, Working Paper: Expropriation
- Principles of Compensation, supra, note 12 at 23-24; Manning, supra, note 17
at 43; Todd, supra, note 12 at 354-58
126. 1973, 21 & 22 Eliz. 2, c. 26. For a good technical discussion of English
expropriation (compulsory purchase) law see: D. M. Lawrence and V. Moore,
Compulsory Purchase and Compensation (5th ed. London: Estates Gazette, 1972),
particularly c. 12
127. S.N.S. 1969, c. 16
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expropriated property. It was also indicated that the events
surrounding the proposed Sackville landfill site project almost gave
rise to the Board's first case in the area. In summary, therefore, it
might be interesting to conjecture as to the outcome in that situation
had the property been expropriated. 
128
This speculation is made easier by the fact that the proposed
project did give rise to litigation, the basis of which was sufficiently
similar to that which would have been the case on an expropriation.
Barrett Lumber Co. v. Municipality of the County of Halifax,
129
involved an application by a company for a declaration that a by-law
of the defendant municipality, rezoning the plaintiff's land from
general building area to salvage and dump zone, was ultra vires.
The relevant facts, as they appear in the judgment of Jones J., 130
were that the Metropolitan Area Planning Commission (MAPC)
applied to the municipality for the rezoning of lands to
accommodate a new sanitary landfill operation which was to be
operated by the Regional Authority on behalf of the three
metropolitan area governments. It appeared from the evidence that
the lands, all of which belonged to the plaintiff company, would be
acquired by the provincial government and then turned over to the
Regional Authority to manage the scheme.
The company led evidence, in the form of an appraiser's
affidavit, that the rezoning to salvage and dump use had drastically
reduced the value of its lands. On the basis of this, the company
claimed, inter alia, that the municipality's purpose in enacting the
by-law was to depress the value of the property in the sense that,
upon expropriation, compensation would only be payable on the
basis of the salvage and dump use.
Jones J. considered this contention of the company to be an
allegation of bad faith on the part of the municipality. 131 However,
notwithstanding the fact that he considered there had been no
satisfactory explanation given as to why expropriation proceedings
were not commenced before the application to rezone, he held that
the municipality did not act in bad faith in adopting the by-law and
128. The proposal to put a sanitary landfill site in Sackville on the lands in
question was rather controversial in terms of protest by local residents, etc. The
scheme has apparently been abandoned.
129. S.H. 05946, judgment delivered: February 21, 1975, as yet unreported
(N.S.S.C., T.D.)
130. Id. at 1-5
131. Id. at 12
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that the by-law was valid.' 32
The only statement made by Jones J. as to the possible effect of
the by-law had the property been expropriated was:
I cannot conclude on the evidence that the purpose of the
application was to depreciate the value of the land even though it
may have that effect. I may say that I am not entirely satisfied
that the rezoning will in the result affect the compensation
payable in the event of an expropriation. 133
In light of the authorities discussed earlier in this article, there
would appear to be little doubt that the rezoning to salvage and
dump would not affect the compensation payable upon an
expropriation. On the one hand, it could be argued quite effectively,
on the basis of the two Wascana cases, that the zoning by-law was
merely "part of the expropriating machinery". In this regard, it
should be noted that bad faith need not be proved and that, on the
facts, it could quite reasonably be inferred that there was
collaboration between MAPC, the municipality and the province.
Indeed, it was MAPC which had made the application for the
rezoning and there was evidence that the province intended to
expropriate the land and turn it over to the Regional Authority
which was to run the scheme for, inter alia, the Municipality.
On the other hand, even if this argument were unsuccessful, it
would appear to be highly probable, ignoring the use to which the
land was to be put by the expropriating authority in accordance with
section 33(a) of the Expropriation Act, 134 that an application for
rezoning, back to a general building zone, would be successful.
Moreover, it would be almost inconceivable in such circumstances
that any discount would be made for the risk of not obtaining such
rezoning.
In the result, it appears that this case is perhaps too clear on its
facts to really test the applicability of the jurisprudence. The far
more difficult decisions will come in situations similar to the
Farlinger case, where the Expropriations Compensation Board, if it
applies the principles properly, will be forced to second-guess the
intentions, not only of the particular council involved, but also of
the Planning Appeal Board.
In conclusion, it can be questioned whether the approach
indicated by Re Gibson and City of Toronto and the cases which
132. Id. at 15
133. Id. at 15-16
134. S.N.S. 1973, c. 7
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followed it is really capable of being applied in an age of planning
where more than one level of government or governmental agency
has jurisdiction to determine the uses to which land can be put. Both
issues, down-zoning prior to expropriation and the probability of
rezoning to realize full potential, where they are given proper
consideration, involve a great deal of time and expense in terms of
testimony by expert witnesses, preparation and argument by
counsel, and decision-making by the tribunal. Does the almost
inevitable "rough justice", which results from the exercise, really
justify such a cost?
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